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Abstract
The tendency to lie is a part of personality. But are personality traits the only factors that
make some people lie more often than others? We propose that cognitive abilities have
equal importance. People with higher cognitive abilities are better, and thus more effective
liars. This might reinforce using lies to solve problems. Yet, there is no empirical research
that shows this relationship in healthy adults. Here we present three studies in which the par-
ticipants had free choice about their honesty. We related differences in cognitive abilities
and personality to the odds of lying. Results show that personality and intelligence are both
important. People low on agreeableness and intelligent extraverts are most likely to lie. This
suggests that intelligence might mediate the relationship between personality traits and
lying frequency. While personality traits set general behavioral tendencies, intelligence and
environment set boundaries.
Introduction
In everyday social life, frequent lying, manipulation and taking advantage of others is consid-
ered maladaptive and generally condemned by society—big lies may lead to substantial legal,
social and personal damages. But not all lies share these adverse characteristics. The most com-
mon white lies cause little harm or might even be beneficial for others. Although both types
are present in everyday social life, recent research has shown that it is honesty that determines
most people’s actions and decisions [1,2] with relatively few ‘prolific liars’ who are responsible
for the majority of lies [3]. What are the factors that affect how often people lie and manipulate
others?
The tendency to lie is embedded in our personalities—each person has an attitude towards
lying in specific situations. Several personality traits (for example, psychopathy) are partially
defined in terms of deceiving and manipulating others. Research suggests that different
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combinations of personality traits increase the likelihood of lying [4–10]. People high in anti-
social personality traits—Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy, known collectively
as ’the Dark Triad’ [11]—lie more often; psychopathy is linked to lies for no reason, narcissism
to self-gain lies and Machiavellianism to white as well as self-gain lies [4–6]. Personality traits
without antisocial characteristics are also relevant. People high in psychoticism lie more often
both to themselves and others [10]. Neurotic people use more self-deception and have a more
deceptive communication style [9]. People high on social adroitness and extraversion reported
telling more lies during social interactions [5]. In one study the authors demonstrated that
people high on manipulativeness and moral disengagement are less likely to refrain from lying
when their reputation is at risk [8]. These results confirm that personality traits influence the
likelihood of lying in different contexts. But are personality traits the only dispositional charac-
teristics that influence how likely people are to lie?
We propose that general intelligence (G) and executive functions [12] might be just as
important. Mechanistic models of deception—such as the Working Memory Model of Decep-
tion [13], Activation-Decision-Construction Model (ADCM, [14]), Activation-Decision-Con-
struction-Action Theory (ADCAT, [15]) and cognitive neuroscience models of deception [16]
—include executive functions as essential components. According to these models, working
memory construes false answers, attentional shifts engage when false and true answers are
given one after another, and inhibition prevents giving a true answer when the individual
wants to lie. Brain imaging studies of deception show a consistent pattern of increased brain
activity in executive function-related networks [17,18]. Lying is more difficult for people with
Parkinson’s Disease, which primarily affects brain systems important for executive functions
[19]. Executive functions had been considered as building blocks for G [20,21], but later
research showed that only working memory updating and storage capacity are relevant [22–
24] for both fluid (Gf) and crystallized (Gc) intelligence.
It seems that both types of G are important for the quality and thus effectiveness of lies. The
link between G and deception frequency was reported in the developmental literature—G of
3-year old girls correlated positively with the frequency of their engagement in deception, as
reported by the mothers [25]. People with high G are better at faking personality questionnaire
responses to fit the profile desired by a potential employer than people with low G [26]. Vrij,
Granhag and Mann [27] highlight three features that might be associated with cognitive abili-
ties and make the individual a better liar: verbal fluency, originality and speed of processing.
Verbal fluency is associated with intelligence [28], originality with creativity [29], and speed of
processing affects many low-level cognitive functions. High levels of these abilities enable indi-
viduals to produce more credible lies with less cognitive load, even in new, unexpected situa-
tions. More creative individuals might feel more entitled and engage more often in unethical
behaviors [30]. A potential role of G for lying is emphasized in Information Manipulation The-
ory 2 (IMT2, [31]), where everyday lies are viewed as quick and easy solutions where honesty
could be problematic. In IMT2, the estimated cognitive load of each potential solution is con-
sidered when choosing how to respond to a given situation. This implies that people with
higher cognitive abilities should be more likely to choose an option associated with greater
cognitive load—they will recognize lying as an option they can easily put into effect. Therefore,
the proposed link between cognitive abilities and lying frequency is indirect: deceptive behav-
iors are reinforced through their effectiveness. Furthermore, people with higher cognitive abil-
ities might be able to make more accurate judgments about the benefits of deceptive behaviors
given the context. In adolescents, reports suggest positive relationship between verbal and cre-
ative intelligence and arrogant/deceptive interpersonal style [32]. The authors argue that intel-
ligence facilitates the expression of some aspects of psychopathy; abilities such as reading
others, manipulating and being able to charm others are unlikely to be executed efficiently
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without high cognitive abilities. A similar relationship with verbal intelligence was also
reported in a clinical sample of adults [33]. These studies have related intelligence to personal-
ity traits that are, by definition, linked to deception, but did not assess lying frequency directly.
To our knowledge, the link between cognitive abilities and an empirically assessed frequency
of lying has never been demonstrated in healthy adults. Here we attempt to fill this gap.
We hypothesized that participants with higher cognitive abilities would choose deceptive
behaviors more often than participants with lower cognitive abilities. To test the hypothesis,
we designed two new laboratory-based paradigms in which the participant decided whether
and when to lie or tell the truth. We chose laboratory-based contexts, so that all participants
could be consistently probed. In the first paradigm (used in Experiments 1 and 3), it was
explicitly suggested that both honest and deceptive behaviors can lead to achieving the goal
of the scenario. In the second paradigm (used in Experiment 2), an incentive to lie was
introduced. We also measured individual differences in fluid intelligence, selected executive
functions (working memory updating, attention switching and response inhibition) and
personality traits [34].
Methods
In this section, we present the methodology used for each experiment, followed by the statisti-
cal framework used for analyses. The tasks in each experiment were performed inside a MRI
scanner. The projects presented here addressed two main questions: who is most likely to lie
and how do the choices affect the neural correlates of deception and truth-telling. We felt that
for clarity, these two aspects of the experiments should be presented separately. Here we pres-
ent the results pertinent to the question about individual differences.
Experiment 1
Participants. Seventy-six individuals (38 females) participated in the study. The partici-
pants’ mean age was 25.36 (SD = 5.01). The subjects were recruited through advertisement
posted on an Internet forum (Gumtree). All subjects were Caucasian, native Polish speakers.
All of them were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal (contact lenses) vision.
The study was approved by the University of Social Sciences and Humanities ethics commit-
tee. They all signed a written consent before participating in the study.
Measurement of individual differences. Fluid intelligence was assessed with the Stan-
dard Plus version of Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) [35]. We used a paper-and-pencil
version of the test. Participants were given unlimited time to complete the test. The raw scores
were converted to centiles based on the Polish norms [36] and used for further analyses.
We used the 3-back task to assess working memory updating ability [37,38]. The stimuli
used in 3-back task were abstract objects. We instructed the participants to press a response
button when they detected a target—the same stimulus as presented three items before—and
refrain from responding otherwise. Lures on positions n-1 and n-2 were also present. Based on
performance, we estimated discriminability (d’ or d-prime) and bias using Signal Detection
Theory [39] methods implemented with a hierarchical Bayesian model [40]. d’ indicates how
well the person discriminates between signals and noise, bias describes the strategy used when
responding. Two levels of hierarchy were included in the model—the group-level and individ-
ual-level. This procedure substantially improves the power of estimation. Individual-level
means of posterior distributions at were used as performance measures.
Response inhibition was assessed with a custom implementation of Stop Signal Task.
The Go trials were digits, excluding 0 and 5. After digit presentation, for 25% of the trials
a bracket (the stop signal) surrounding the digit appeared on the screen. The computer
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program controlling the experiment adjusted the delay of bracket (i.e. Stop Signal Delay,
SSD)—increased the SSD by a fixed time after successful inhibition and decreased it after
false alarms—so that each participant performed at 50% accuracy. We asked the participants
to judge whether the digit was odd or even as quickly as possible, but withdraw from pressing
a button when the bracket appeared. We used Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) as the pri-
mary performance measure. SSRT were estimated using a Bayesian hierarchical model [41].
Like in the signal detection theory model used for d’ and bias estimation, the two levels of
hierarchy in the SSRT model correspond to group- and individual-level estimates. Means of
posterior distributions at individual-level were used as the response inhibition performance
measure.
Attention switching was assessed with a computer-based version of the Stroop task [42]. In
the task participants are asked to make a binary choice regarding the color of the presented
text. Congruent (e.g. ‘blue’ written with blue font) and incongruent (e.g. ‘blue’ written with red
font) stimuli were presented. Although the Stroop task involves several cognitive functions,
including pre-potent response inhibition and attentional control, we use it here as a measure
of attention switching. To achieve that we calculated median reaction times for consecutive
congruent trials and for incongruent trials following congruent trials. We interpret the differ-
ence between the two as a measure of attention switching effectiveness.
Personality was assessed by the use the paper-and-pencil version of NEO-Five Factor
Inventory (NEO-FFI [34,43]). NEO-FFI consists of 60 items and the results are calculated for
five subscales: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness to
Experience. We decided to use this questionnaire instead of direct measurement of antisocial
personality traits for three main reasons. First, NEO-FFI provides a broad description of per-
sonality beyond antisocial traits, thus providing more exploratory value. Second, NEO-FFI
has been adapted and validated in the Polish language [44,45]. Third, we studied samples of
healthy participants. Most tools assessing antisocial traits are clinical, and thus not suitable for
testing individual differences in healthy individuals.
Deception task. We used the free-choice version of Speed-Dating Task (SDT) [46]. SDT
is based on a real-life event, in which participants engage in short conversations. After each
conversation, they decide if they want to meet their speed-date for a real date. After completion
of such an event, the organizer shares phone numbers to the matched pairs. We have used this
concept to introduce social context within the SDT.
In SDT, participants respond with a yes/no answer to sets of questions asked by different
dates that are presented on a screen. The dates are virtual characters made up by the experi-
menters. Each date ‘asks’ 20 questions about the participant’s attitude towards one of four top-
ics (religion, Weltanschauung, personality or external appearance). Questions related to one
topic are asked by two dates, so the participant engages in 8 speed-dates during SDT. For each
topic, the two dates asking questions represent an opposite, stereotypical attitude, e.g. one of
the dates who ask questions about religion is a very devout catholic, whereas the other is an
atheist strongly opposing the church. After each response given by the participant, feedback
is displayed on the screen as a frownie or smiley. A smiley indicates that the participant’s
response is consistent with their current date’s attitude, while the frownie indicates inconsis-
tency. Each date has a fixed set of response-dependent feedback messages that are contingent
with their attitude towards the discussed topic. For a pair of dates with opposite attitudes
related to the same topic, the response-feedback mapping is exactly opposite, i.e. if the partici-
pant responds the same way for both dates, he/she will receive a smiley on one occasion and a
frownie on the other. Looking at feedbacks, participants learn very quickly (after 1–2 ques-
tions) what kind of attitude the date represents. An example trial for the Speed-Dating Task is
presented in Fig 1.
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The goal was to respond to questions in a way that would convince all speed-dates to opt
for a real date. It was explicitly stated that this goal could be achieved if the participant remains
honest all the time—hoping that the dates will appreciate it—as well as adapt the responses
when necessary to appear similar to each date. Thus, the participants had a free choice about
the way they wanted to achieve the goal. We refer to the chosen behavior in SDT as ‘strategy’.
We told the participants that they would be paid 50 PLN (approx. 12 EUR) each for the par-
ticipation in the experiment, but can make up to twice as much if they manage to convince all
speed-dates to meet (in fact everyone received 100 PLN for participation).
Procedure. The day before participating in the study, all participants filled out an online
questionnaire related to their attitudes towards the topics discussed during the dates. At that
point, the participants were not informed what the purpose of filling out the questionnaire
was, but were explicitly asked to respond honestly. The questionnaire consisted of the same
items as in SDT, which had the form of a statement, rather than a question. For each statement,
the participant could respond ‘agree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘hard to tell’. The responses given in a ques-
tionnaire were used to qualify later responses in SDT as honest or deceptive. Questions for
which the participants responded ‘hard to tell’ were excluded from further analyses, although
they were presented during SDT.
SDT was performed in a 3T Siemens Trio MRI scanner. The stimuli were displayed on a
27” MRI-compatible LCD monitor placed behind the scanner. The monitor was seen by the
subjects through a system of mirrors mounted on the head coil. Stimulus delivery, as well as
response recording was controlled by Neurobehavioral Systems Presentation. The participants
responded with NeuroNordicLab ResponseGrip response pads held in both hands. Thumbs
were used for yes/no responses.
After completion of the MRI protocol, the participants filled out the NEO-FFI personality
questionnaire. They were debriefed afterwards and an appointment was made for behavioral
testing on another day.
During behavioral testing, the researcher administered the tasks in the following order:
3-back, Stop-Signal Task, Stroop task, Raven’s Test. After the tests were completed the partici-
pants received compensation for participation in the experiment.
Behavioral strategy calculation. Following the experiment, we classified the responses
recorded during SDT into 7 categories. The categories were based on the responses given
Fig 1. Time course of a single trial in Speed-Dating Task. The received feedback was dependent on consistency of the
participant’s response with their date’s attitudes.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176591.g001
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by respective participants in the pre-study attitude questionnaire and their context within the
task:
• Honest consistent (HC) responses—truthful responses consistent with interlocutor’s attitude
(positive feedback)
• Honest inconsistent (HI)—truthful, but inconsistent with interlocutor’s attitude (negative
feedback)
• Deceptive consistent (DC)—dishonest responses, but in line with interlocutor’s attitude
(positive feedback)
• Deceptive inconsistent (DI)—dishonest responses, inconsistent with interlocutor’s attitude
(negative feedback)
• Adaptive response (AD)—consistent with interlocutor’s attitude, without specific attitude of
the participant (positive feedback)
• Defiant (DEF)—inconsistent with interlocutor’s attitude, without specification of partici-
pant’s attitude (negative feedback)
• Miss—questions without responses (negative feedback)
We have used only HI and DC responses for strategy calculation:
S ¼
NDC
NDC þ NHI
where S denotes strategy for one participant. In other words, strategy is expressed as a fraction
of deceptive responses in the context of discordance between the participant’s and date’s atti-
tude towards a specific issue. Therefore, strategy reflects how likely the person is to lie, given
the opportunity. AD and DEF responses cannot be classified as truths or lies, therefore they
are omitted from calculation. DI responses were rare (S1 Fig) and did not provide additional
information about the participant’s behavior.
Experiment 2
Participants. 44 subjects (22 females) participated in Experiment 2. The mean age of the
participants was 22.07 (SD = 2.85). The recruitment process started with e-mails sent to the
participants of former fMRI studies in the Nencki Institute. Those who agreed to take part in
the experiment were asked to become a team captain, invite some friends to take part in the
study as well, and form a team of 6 participants. The aim of this recruitment strategy was to
encourage cooperation within teams and competition between teams. To make sure that all
the team members met the requirements for MRI scanning, they were asked to fill in an appli-
cation form posted on a website. Through the website, all the team members were also pre-
sented with an advertisement and regulations of the location-based game being part of the
study. Once the teams were formed and accepted, all the members were asked to fill in another
form and give some personal details that were in fact true answers to autobiographical ques-
tions used in the game. All the participants were native Polish speakers, right-handed, with no
history of neurological diseases and normal or corrected-to-normal (contact lenses) vision.
The study was approved by the University of Social Sciences and Humanities ethics commit-
tee. All of them signed a written consent form before participating in the study.
Measurement of individual differences. We used the same individual differences mea-
sures as in Experiment 1.
More intelligent extraverts are more likely to deceive
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176591 April 27, 2017 6 / 17
Deception task & procedure. The context for deception in Study 2 was set in a location-
based game designed by MR. In this type of real-world games participants complete tasks
with varying difficulty. These tasks usually involve finding items or persons. The tasks were
chained, so that the completion of one task led to another task in another physical location.
The location-based game ’Meeting the spy’ was organized in Warsaw, in a big city park
nearby the Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology. Only one team of 6–8 persons took part
in the game each time, so it was organized seven times (additional three times in a pilot study).
The game started at the Nencki Institute with the presentation of detailed instructions for the
participants. Each participant was given a map and written instructions, and the whole team
received a tablet with a special GPS application based on the Geocaching system. The whole
team was asked to search for 2 characters, 2 caches and to complete 3 tasks. Creativity and
accuracy were assessed, regardless of how long it took them to complete the gameplay. How-
ever, the participants were also informed that the score obtained by each team would only
partly influence their chances for the final individual financial reward. The main competition
would require answering questions about the details of the game individually, during an fMRI
experiment. In this way, all the members of the team were encouraged to get properly involved
in the game and remember as much as possible. There were two characters engaged in the
game and waiting in the park for the teams to describe their tasks and to answer any possible
questions.
When all tasks were completed the teams were asked to come back to the Nencki Institute
where they were introduced to the process of MR data acquisition and presented with all safety
regulations. Also, each participant completed an MRI safety screening questionnaire and the
scanning sessions were scheduled for the same day. Each session was preceded by a conversa-
tion with an experimenter, IS. In a separate room, participants were given a list of questions
about the details of the game and asked to answer truthfully. Then, they were given the instruc-
tions (S1 Text) of an upcoming interrogation. Being fully truthful was treated as an evidence
of cooperation with the interrogator and guaranteed a low financial reward (approximately
3EUR). Concealing the details of the game guaranteed receiving a high financial reward
(approximately 60EUR). However, the interrogator had already received two sources of infor-
mation: the forms that they completed online and the lists of questions concerning the game
that they had just completed. They were instructed to give true answers to these questions to
make the interrogator trust them. Subsequently, they were given another list of questions
which had not been given to the interrogator. The experimenter discussed all the unclear ques-
tions with the participants and pointed out that the questions received by the interrogator
formed several topic categories. This way, the participants could easily remember when they
were supposed to tell the truth. Finally, the participants were left alone for 10 minutes to com-
pare two groups of questions and choose the preferable strategy.
During a functional scanning sequence, the participants saw the same instructions on the
screen. They were asked 120 questions which they had already known. Some of these questions
were autobiographical (based on the online forms), others addressed their witness status (eg.
Have you seen . . .?), or their participant experience (e.g. Have you taken part . . .?). Questions
were displayed until the answer yes/ no was given by pressing the button, but no longer than
6s. The questions were separated by an inter-stimulus interval of 1–12.5s.
Behavioral strategy calculation. There were several criteria for classifying the questions
in Experiment 2. The first criterion was related to whether the question addressed the events
during the location-based game in a witness or participant role. The third option here was
autobiographical questions for which the participants were supposed to respond honestly; this
option was not considered for calculating the strategy. The second criterion was the veracity
of the response itself. The third criterion was whether the response was given in concordance
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with the instructions (i.e. don’t lie when you declared the facts beforehand). This led to the fol-
lowing classification:
• Participant, honest adequately (PHA)
• Participant, honest inadequately (PHI)
• Participant, deceptive adequately (PDA)
• Participant, deceptive inadequately (PDI)
• Witness, honest adequately (WHA)
• Witness, honest inadequately (WHI)
• Witness, deceptive adequately (WDA)
• Witness, deceptive inadequately (WDI)
• Misses—questions without response
We used the following equation to estimate strategy:
S ¼
NPDA þ NWDA
NPDA þ NWDA þ NPDI þ NWDI
where S denotes strategy for one participant. In other words, strategy is expressed here a frac-
tion of deceptive responses for questions not revealed to the interrogator in the questionnaire.
Experiment 3
Participants. 34 subjects (12 females) participated in Experiment 3. The mean age was
23.3 (SD = 2.62) The participants were recruited by a social media group related to cognitive
neuroscience. They all signed a written consent form before participating in the study. The
group consisted mainly of undergraduate students. The study was approved by the University
of Social Sciences and Humanities ethics committee.
Measurement of individual differences. In Experiment 3, the set of psychological mea-
sures of cognitive abilities was slightly altered. The same constructs were investigated. For
fluid intelligence, we used Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM). The change was
motivated by a plan to recruit a rather homogeneous sample of university students. For atten-
tion switching, we used a custom implementation of continuous counting task [47]. In this
task participants were required to count different objects presented alone (big or small
squares) and keep a running count of each type of object. After a variable number of objects
had been presented, participants were asked to report their counts for each object separately.
We calculated the accuracy of the counts. Measures of working memory performance
(3-back), response inhibition and personality remained the same as in previous experiments.
Deception task & procedure. We used the free-choice SDT as in Experiment 1, but intro-
duced slight modifications. First, during the SDT questions to which the participants did not
have an opinion (i.e. answered ‘don’t know’ in the attitude questionnaire) did not appear dur-
ing the task. Second, the participants received a fixed gratification of 50 PLN (12 EUR) and
the instructions did not state any additional rewards depending on the number of convinced
dates. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1.
Strategy estimation. The responses were classified according to the same scheme as in
Experiment 1. AD and DEF response types are present here, because the questions for which
the participants did not declare a clear attitude in the questionnaire were removed from the
main experiment. We calculated the strategy in the same way as in Experiment 1.
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Data analysis. We conducted an integrated analysis of the results of the three studies with
a full Bayesian inference framework. Bayesian framework allows for formal incorporation of
prior knowledge into the data analysis process, making it ideal for integrating results of several
studies. In other words, the Bayesian framework allows the researchers to integrate knowledge
about results from the previous experiments (priors) with the current data (likelihood) to pro-
duce a consensus of the two (posterior). The posterior knowledge from one study can then be
used as a prior for another.
In Experiment 1, for each parameter the prior is a Gaussian distribution with μ = 0 and σ =
1. This prior can be considered as informative and causes shrinkage of uncertain parameter
estimates towards zero. The motivation for using this prior is the assumption that very high
effect sizes are unlikely given the noisy nature of psychological measurements conducted here.
The posterior distributions of parameter estimates were updated with the data from Experi-
ment 2 and Experiment 3. Weakly informative prior was used for the intercept in each experi-
ment (a Gaussian with μ = 0 and σ = 1), because the base probability of choosing a deceptive
behavior varied between experiments. The posterior distributions after all updates were used
as the basis for inference.
We used a linear logistic regression model for statistical inference. Each variable was nor-
malized (z-scored) before entering the model. Although the dependent variables used in all
three studies could be expressed as ’continuous’ in the range 0–1, their bimodal distribution
indicated that binarizing into two discrete categories (honest/deceptive) would allow us to pro-
duce a more accurate statistical model. Thus, for each experiment, the estimated strategy was
binarized with the cut-off point at 0.5–0 indicated complete honesty and 1 complete deception.
For each parameter, we report both the mean, as well as 95% credible interval (95% CI) of the
posterior parameter estimate distribution. We do not report Bayes Factors because of their
high dependency on prior specification. The posteriors reported here can be updated when
more data is acquired.
For statistical modeling, we used R version 3.3.0 [48] with RStanARM [49] version 2.12.1
high-level interface for Stan [50] package. All analysis scripts, as well as anonymized raw data
are available on https://github.com/mfalkiewicz/cognition_personality_deception. The results
of the analyses are fully reproducible.
Missing and removed data. The combined number of participants in all the three studies
was 154. However, complete data was available only for 102 subjects, which were included in
the analyses reported below. The primary reason for this is the fact that analytical methods
used here required complete data to include the participant in the analysis. Missing data
were randomly distributed across participants, therefore the amount of usable data decreased
dramatically.
For 6 subjects, the data about their behavior during the deception task was not available
due to technical problems with response pads—the responses were not recorded. RPM scores
were not available for 3 subjects. The data related to 3-back task performance was not available
for 18 subjects, of whom 13 participated in Experiment 1. The data from the Stop Signal Task
was not available for 26 participants, of whom 20 participated in Experiment 1. This large
amount of missing data was predominantly due to either technical problems with the equip-
ment (response pads) or software. Lastly, NEO scores were unavailable for 11 participants, all
participating in Experiment 3. This was because NEO scores were assessed sometime after the
completion of the experiment and not all participants could be reached.
We removed 6 subjects from the analyses in Experiment 2, because they did not comply
with the instructions, i.e. deceived in every question.
We have decided to present the results of such a highly-reduced sample to consider all mea-
sured variables. However, to verify the robustness of the results, we performed the same data
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analysis, but we took only fluid intelligence and personality scores into consideration. This
analysis, which includes 135 participants gives convergent results with the analyses presented
here, showing even stronger effects. The results of this analysis are presented and discussed in
S1 Table.
Results and discussion
Strategies
In all three experiments, we observed a very similar bimodal distribution of strategies (Fig 2).
In E1 and E3 most participants chose to either remain honest almost all time, or be deceptive,
with relatively few intermediate strategies. In E2, majority of the participants chose to attempt
a deceptive strategy. This is probably because lying in E2 could lead to substantial monetary
gain, while nothing could be gained from honesty. Despite a clear advantage of the deceptive
strategy, few participants still chose to remain honest most of the time. Distributions of each
response within each experiment are presented in S1 Fig.
Individual differences and deception odds
The process of updating beliefs about parameter estimates is illustrated in S2 Fig. Markov
Chains converged for all parameters (Rhat = 1). The parameter estimates for the model
reported here are presented in S1 Table.
Demographic measures
Age and biological sex did not show any significant relationship with deception odds.
Although the posterior distribution of age has the highest density at 0.38, it also has very
wide credible intervals (95% CI: [-0.54–1.3]). Therefore, we cannot conclude any significant
role of biological sex for deception odds. Age has a positive relationship with deception odds
—elder people are more likely to choose a deceptive strategy, but the effect is relatively small
(M = 0.15, 95% CI: [0.01–0.29]).
Fig 2. Histograms representing the distribution of strategies chosen by participants in each experiment. For analysis, the strategies were binarized
with threshold = 0.5.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176591.g002
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Fluid intelligence and extraversion
The Raven’s Progressive Matrices score has significant relationship with deception odds. One
standard deviation increase in RPM results in an increase of log-odds of choosing deceptive
strategy by 0.63 (95% CI: [0.49–0.77]). To give a more intuitive understanding of these num-
bers, we can convert them to probabilities. For all subsequent conversions, we will assume that
a person with an average RPM score has a 50% probability of choosing a deceptive strategy.
Increase in log odds by 0.63 means that a person with an RPM score 1 standard deviation
above the mean will have the probability of choosing a deceptive strategy equal to 65% and a
person with 2 SD above the mean: 78%. We also found an interaction of RPM score with extra-
version (M = 0.36, 95% CI: [0.24–0.49]). However, extraversion alone has a relatively weak
relationship with deception odds (M = 0.17, 95% CI: [0.03–0.31]). A graphical representation
of this relationship is presented in Fig 3. For introverts, changes in intelligence have little
Fig 3. Gf x extraversion interaction. The numbers in cells denote the probability of choosing a deceptive strategy, with
assumption that a person with average IQ and extraversion has the probability 50%. The values in axes represent
standard deviations w.r.t. the mean value.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176591.g003
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impact on deception odds. On the other hand, the dependency between IQ and deception
odds is strong for extraverts. Highly intelligent extraverts are the most likely to choose a decep-
tive strategy and the least intelligent extraverts are least likely.
The previously reported relationship between extraversion and frequency of lying are con-
tradictory. A significant relationship was found in one study [5] and no significant relationship
was found in another [10]. Functions that lies serve might be especially important for extra-
verts because of their high level of sociability [5]. The novelty of the work presented here is the
finding that the effect of extraversion on lying frequency depends on intelligence (or, con-
versely, effect of fluid intelligence on lying frequency depends on extraversion level). This find-
ing links the well-established relationship between personality traits and deception frequency
with cognitive aspects of lying. The role of fluid intelligence here is unclear. It might have an
indirect effect on lying frequency by making the person a more successful liar, which in turn
reinforces the use of deceptive behaviors [31]. Alternatively, one might speculate that in the
context of current studies that higher fluid intelligence made the participants pursue decep-
tion, realizing it to be the most successful strategy.
The mechanism responsible for the presence of such interaction also remains speculative.
Given that high cognitive abilities are important for a good liar [27] and that extraverts are
more sensitive to positive outcomes of social lies [5], high levels of both might make a person
especially inclined to deceive. Introverts would be less sensitive to potential social rewards,
therefore less prone to deception. Less intelligent people would be less likely to deceive because
they do not have a successful history of lying and/or are less likely to perceive deception as ben-
eficial. Less intelligent extraverts might have had an unsuccessful history of deceptions in social
context, therefore might be less likely to pursue such behaviors.
Other personality traits
Agreeableness has a significant, negative relationship with deception odds (M = -0.65, 95% CI:
[-0.79 –-0.5]). The more agreeable the person is, the less likely he/she is to choose a deceptive
strategy. A person with agreeableness 1 SD above the mean has the probability 34% of choos-
ing a deceptive strategy, whereas for a person with agreeableness 2 SD below the mean the
probability drops to 21%. Agreeableness does not interact with RPM (M = 0.08, 95% CI:
[-0.07–0.22]). Neuroticism (M = -0.21, 95% CI: [-0.35 –-0.06]) and conscientiousness (M =
-0.33, 95% CI: [-0.47 –-0.19]) are both negatively related to deception odds. Openness to expe-
rience is positively related to deception odds (M = 0.15, 95% CI: [0.01–0.29]), i.e. persons with
higher openness are more likely to choose a deceptive strategy. There are no interactions of
personality dimensions mentioned above with fluid intelligence.
Significant relationships between all measured personality dimensions and deception
odds are pleasing, because they support the face validity of deception contexts investigated
here. All Big Five measures are correlated with Dark Triad traits, with agreeableness, consci-
entiousness and neuroticism showing negative correlations and openness to experience and
extraversion showing a positive relationship [11]. Therefore, this exact pattern of relation-
ships is related to higher Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy. Furthermore, the
personality dimension most strongly related to deception odds in the presented studies,
agreeableness, shows strongest and most consistent negative correlation with all Dark Triad
traits [51]. Although Dark Triad traits were not measured here directly, this pattern of results
strongly suggests the behaviors chosen during the deception tasks are related to the level of
participants’ antisocial traits.
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Other cognitive measures
No other cognitive measures showed a convincing relationship with deception odds. SSRT
(M = 0.03, 95% CI: [-0.1–0.17]), switching costs in Stroop task (M = 0, 95% CI: [-0.27–0.28]),
as well as bias in 3-back task (M = 0.03, 95% CI: [-0.25–0.31]) have a relatively narrow poste-
rior distribution centered around zero. The posterior distribution for accuracy in the continu-
ous counting task is very wide (M = 0.22, 95% CI: [-0.51–0.96]) and cannot be considered as
significantly different from zero. Discriminability in the 3-back task has a slightly positive
mean (M = 0.1, 95% CI: [-0.03–0.23]) of the posterior distribution, but too large portion of the
distribution crosses zero to consider it significant. The process of updating the posterior is pre-
sented in S2 Fig.
This result might be explained by the fact that involvement of executive functions depend
largely on the type of deception [2,15,31,52]. Probably the executive functions we decided to
measure are more important to other types or aspects of deception (i.e. high-stakes lies) and
their impact is more clearly visible in the instructed lying paradigms. Alternatively, the tests
employed in the reported studies capture only some aspects of constructs they refer to [38].
Hence, it might be the case that other aspects of executive functions are important for different
types of deception.
General discussion
Previous research has clearly indicated that the tendency to engage in deceptive behaviors is
related to specific personality traits and contextual factors [3–6,8,10]. Intellectual abilities are
important for the quality of lies [26,31] and are related to deceptive communication style
[32,33,53]. In the work presented here we investigated whether intellectual abilities are also rel-
evant for the frequency of lying. For this purpose, we performed three laboratory-based experi-
ments in which the subjects were free to choose whether they want to behave deceptively or
not. In the context of location-based game, the deceptive strategy was clearly advantageous,
because of financial incentive to lie. Within the Speed-Dating Task the value of each strategy
was ambiguous and assessed subjectively. Using a Bayesian statistical framework, we combined
the results of all three experiments. The results replicate most of the previously reported rela-
tionships between personality traits and frequency of lying in social interactions. The results
also strongly indicate that fluid intelligence has a significant relationship with deception odds
and interacts with extraversion. Highly intelligent extraverts are most likely to engage in
deceptive behaviors. Highly intelligent introverts as well as extraverts with lower intelligence
are least likely to deceive.
We can think of deception as a tool for adapting to environmental demands. In some situa-
tions, individual goals can be achieved through honesty, in others they can’t. The decisions
are based on subjective judgement—people take into account the expected value of available
behavioral options when deciding whether to lie or not [15]. According to IMT2 [31], people
also take into account the expected difficulty of lying in a given situation—presumably in the
light of their general skill in lying and knowledge about the other person. Therefore, IMT2
treats G as a mediator for situational factors and personality traits. The data collected here
does not allow to make causal claims, but the mediator interpretation is most likely.
In the Speed-Dating Task used in Experiments 1 and 3, adapting to the date’s perspective
(i.e. lying) led to positive feedback. Although the instruction clearly stated that positive feed-
back merely indicates consistency with the date, the smiley associated with such responses
could be interpreted as a form of external reward. This might explain why intelligent extraverts
were most likely to pursue deceptive behavior—they wanted the reward and subjectively
judged that they could be effective in getting it.
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The results suggest a general form of interaction between personality and intelligence for
decision making about lying and truth-telling. While personality traits set general behavioral
tendencies, intelligence and environment set boundaries. People who look for external rewards
(extraverts) will use deception only if they believe they will be successful.
We must remember that intelligence is not the main factor which affects the decision to
lie or not. Our research shows that high intelligence combined with other personality traits
increases the likelihood of lying. Therefore, a model explaining the dispositional factors that
affect decisions to lie should include intelligence as one of its components.
Study limitations
Although this study provides new insights into the role of cognitive abilities for choosing insin-
cere behaviors, there are several limitations that need to be considered. First, we have probed
participants’ behavior in contexts consistent within each study, which removes a large portion
of variability due to the changing context of everyday life. One might ask to what degree these
laboratory-based settings reflect the behaviors in individual’s daily lives. We did not try to con-
vince the participants that the dates are real; depending on the personality and intelligence,
participants might had interpreted the settings as real or artificial, which could affect decisions
about their behavior. The situation was highly artificial, although surprisingly many partici-
pants reported strong emotions during the study. Furthermore, only one form of deception
was available (behaviors were expressed through button presses). Despite that, a highly signifi-
cant relationship of behavior in such conditions with personality traits—expected to be related
to real-life deception frequency—alleviates the concerns about face validity. However, alterna-
tive methods of assessing the frequency of lying should be employed and compared with
results obtained here. Second, the results are based on a relatively small sample size in Experi-
ments 2 and 3, which lead to their relatively small impact on final results. Third, the sampling
of deception contexts was not uniform—70 of 102 participants took part in the Speed-Dating
Task. Therefore, the context of Speed-Dating Task has more impact on the combined results.
Both sample sizes as well as sampling of deception context should be more balanced in future
studies using similar methodology. Fourth, we included mainly young university students
in this study. Despite these limitations, we believe that these results are valid and provide a
unique contribution to research on psychological factors related to decisions to deceive others.
Supporting information
S1 Text. Task instructions. The original instructions were presented in Polish.
(PDF)
S1 Fig. The counts of each response type for each experiment. The whiskers indicate mini-
mum/maximum, the bottom/up of each box indicates 1st and 3rd quartile, respectively and
the horizontal line inside the box indicates the median.
(PDF)
S2 Fig. The evolution of posterior distributions after each experiment. Posteriors from pre-
vious experiments were used as priors in the following experiments.
(PDF)
S1 Table. The parameters of a full and reduced model. The full model includes all measured
variables, but due to missing values includes fewer samples (reported in the main body of the
manuscript). The reduced model excludes the variables with many missing values, but includes
more samples.
(PDF)
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